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ARTICLES
ARE THE RATIONALE AND REGULATORY
SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING HUMAN
SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH OBSOLETE AND
UNWORKABLE, OR ETHICALLY




Many critics of U.S. regulation to protect human subjects of
biomedical and behavioral research deem the system inherently
unworkable and variously inadequate or unnecessary. Many deem its
rationale, the Belmont Report, outdated and philosophically deficient.
Some would scrap or revamp the system. These criticisms and
prescriptions are challenging factually, legally, and ethically. Similar
minimalist, audited self-regulation operates smoothly elsewhere in life
science. Events suggest Belmont's continuing validity in its
administrative-law role as interpretive touchstone for human subjects
protection regulations. U.S. human subjects protection and related
regulations are constitutionally grounded and consistent with U.S.
obligations under human rights law. Criticisms that the system is
inconvenient do not respond to ethical and legal duties-to
acknowledge the innate dignity of human subjects of research, to
recognize and squarely face ethical issues in human subjects research,
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to heed applicable domestic and international law, to say no to projects
when no is warranted, to foster researcher involvement in the system,
to focus on substance rather than form, and to resist automaticity. If
the system is to function protectively and reasonably efficiently, then
the legitimacy of the pertinent law and Belmont's legal role should be
recognized as the primary resource for interpreting the human subjects
regulations; the system and proposed changes should be viewed
critically for efficacy rather than convenience; and policy and practice
should emphasize (a) predictability, stability, and clarity of the
regulatory system, and (b) resources and will to comply and enforce.
INTRODUCTION
Ethical and regulatory implications in reconsidering protection of
human subjects of biomedical and behavioral research
Recent, rapid expansion of the use of human subjects in biomedical
and behavioral research has been accompanied, not surprisingly, by
criticisms of the U.S. regulatory system and its underlying rationale for
protection of these persons. The system has been attacked as
insufficiently protective, especially in view of reported abuses, and,
conversely, as unnecessarily protective and inefficient as against
perceived medical urgency. The regulatory rationale - its factual and
ethical basis - has been attacked as largely irrelevant and inadequate.
Is the regulatory arrangement as unworkable as its critics claim? Is
its rationale no longer valid and useful? This essay is not an exegesis
of either the criticisms or the old rationale. This discussion, rather, is
intended to show some of the kinds and sources of pertinent criticisms
in the public policy arena and to reflect on some of the broader issues.
The regulatory problem may not be in the system itself so much as in
how it is allowed to operate. The value controversies may stem from
too much or too little concern about the willingness of researchers to
take great care as to how they may use other human beings. The issues
are both regulatory and normative.
The salient and inescapable characteristic of biomedical and
behavioral research on human beings is that it is, for the most part, the
use of some human beings for the purposes of other human beings.'
How to do it ethically and whether it should be done at all is a problem
ancient and challenging in theory and in fact - the old questions of
1. Hans Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human
Subjects, 98 DAEDALUS 219 (1969).
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who can fairly use whom how, when, and for what. Researchers have
no special claim on other people; researchers and subjects are persons
of equal dignity, on the same moral plane.2 This is a discomfiting
challenge. It should be kept in mind as research on human beings is
contemplated and conducted and as the regulatory system is reviewed
and re-reviewed. It is too easy to dismiss or lose sight of these issues in
this era of scientific optimism, accomplishment, good intentions, and
routinization of procedures for the ostensible protection of the human
subjects of research.3
The Belmont Report - Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Research, the 1979 report of the
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research 4 - and the regulatory system 5 to
2.
[A]s soon as animate, feeling beings become the subjects of experiment, as
they do in the life sciences and especially in medical research,...
innocence of the search for knowledge is lost and questions of conscience
arise. The depth of which moral and religious sensibilities can become
aroused over these questions is shown by the vivisection issue. Human
experimentation must sharpen the issue as it involves ultimate questions
of personal dignity and sacrosanctity.
Id. at 219.
3. For example:
Despite the obvious need for conducting research on children, during the
1970s, extremists voicing ethical concerns came close to prohibiting such
activity when they insisted on a very strict interpretation of the need for
informed consent, according to Dr. Alexander [Duane Alexander, M.D.,
director, National Institute of Child Health and Human Development].
See Nat'l Institutes of Health, Director's Council of Public
Representatives, Spring 2001 Meeting Minutes (May 1, 2001), available at
http://copr.nih.gov/minutes/spring2001.shtm#children (last visited Nov. 22,
2003).
4. Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Research [Belmont Report], National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Office of the Secretary, U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,], 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192 (April 18,
1979) [hereinafter Belmont Report or Belmont.]. "Because the problems related to
social experimentation may differ substantially from those of biomedical and
behavioral research," the Commission excluded "social experimentation" from its
policy recommendations although not from its ethical construct. Id. at 23,193 & n.
[3] [unnumbered in original]. The Department of Health and Human Services has
continued to reissue Belmont as guidance; available at http://ohrp.osophs.
dhhs.gov/humansubjects/guidance/belmont.htm (last visited November 22, 2003).
2003]
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which the Commission gave moral focus have had a hard time recently.
Absent caution and reflection, Belmont's moral and practical insights
and the consequent awkward but remarkable regulatory arrangement
could give way to ignorance, timidity, convenience, and of course
supposed reform.
Criticisms of the Belmont Report and regulatory system
Some of the discussion at the nexus of public policy, government,
biomedical research administration, and biomedical ethics takes a
markedly utilitarian turn in considering what to do about regulation
for the protection of human subjects of research. The regulatory
system for protecting human subjects in federally funded biomedical
and behavioral research and in drug studies is criticized as
insufficiently protective and as slow, clumsy, and burdensome.6 Some
critics would revamp the system dramatically. Without detailed
5. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs, Protection of Human
Subjects, 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2002), and related procurement regulations, and similar
regulations of other federal agencies.
6. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Office of the Inspector
Gen., Institutional Review Boards: A Time for Reform (1998); U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., Office of the Inspector Gen, Protecting Human Research
Subjects: Status of Recommendations (2000); Nat'l Bioethics Advisory
Commission, Ethical and Policy Issues in Research Involving Human Participants,
Vol. I, Report and Recommendations (Aug. 2001); Anne Wood, Christine Grady
& Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The Crisis in Human Participants Research: Identifying the
Problems and Proposing Solutions (presented to President's Bioethics Council,
Sept. 2002), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/background/emanuel paper.html
(last visited November 22, 2003).
7. The National Bioethics Advisory Commission recommended centralization
of authority to regulate human subject protection in federally funded research and
at the same time recommended that requirements to Institutional Review Boards
(charged with human subject protections) shift "away from procedure," that "the
regulatory burden on IRBs, investigators, and institutions" be reduced, and that
(presumably) less risky research be subject to less IRB scrutiny. NAT'L BIOETHICS
ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 136. A committee of the Institute of
Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences recommended improving support
for, strengthening, and clarifying roles of local IRBs, which the committee would
rename. INST. OF MED.OF THE NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI., RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH: A
SYSTEMS APPROACH TO PROTECTING RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS (Daniel D.
Federman et al. eds., 2002), available at http://www.nap. edulbooks/0309084881/
html/ (last visited November 22, 2003). Ezekiel Emanuel, chief of the Department
of Clinical Bioethics at the Warren G. Magnuson Clinical Center of the National
[Vol. 20:1
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examination, some critics would dismiss concern about whole
categories of research.8  Some critics show open frustration with
Institutes of Health, and colleagues proposed doing away with the system of local
IRBs altogether:
The current system of protecting human research participants is firmly
rooted in review and oversight at on the local, institutional level. The
rationale of reason and convenience that originally led to this structure,
however, no longer holds for the modern research endeavor. Not only
does the research community and public feel that it has become
burdensome and inefficient, but it has contributed to participant harms.
While many groups are attempting to respond to these issues, they do so
in a piecemeal fashion that addresses only specific issues. We propose a
more comprehensive solution - a system of REBs [Regional Ethics
Boards], RRCs [Regional Review Committees], and EPCs [Ethics Policy
Committees] - that completely restructures the system of human
participants protections. In doing so, this new system promotes protection
of human participants in research while alleviating the distress of the
research community, honoring both the interests of human participants
and the interests of the research community.
WOOD, GRADY & EMANUEL, supra note 6. Emanuel testified:
I think it's fair to say that everyone seems dissatisfied with the current
system of protecting human research participants. Many of our
researchers find the system onerous and more of a hurdle to get over than
something that is value-added ........ The pharmaceutical and
biotechnology industry finds the process very time-consuming, very
inefficient, and very resistant to innovative and novel approaches in
research....
... I think, yes, they [regional boards and committees] are going to be
distant from you, but, on the other, they are also going to be -they might
be more efficient.
Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Testimony at President's Bioethics Council, Sixth Meeting,
Session 2: Regulation 6: Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) (Sept. 12, 2002)
(transcript available at http://www.bioethics.gov/transcripts/sep02/session2.html
(last visited November 22, 2003). See also Jeffrey M. Drazen, Controlling
Research Trials, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1,377, 1,379 (2003) (contending that the
National Institutes of Health, not the Office for Human Research Protections,
Department of Health and Human Services, is the proper agency to investigate de
novo concerns over whether research design raises issues of research subject
safety). Drazen maintains that a clinical trial proposal that survives multiple levels
of scrutiny by science review panels before reaching an ethics review board "must
have merit." Id.
8. For example:
Most social and behavioral research presents no more than minimal risk.
The statement... "no procedures for which written consent is normally
20031
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emphasis on autonomy and informed consent in opposition to notions
of group rights. 9  On an Internet bioethics list-serve, Belmont is
trashed as philosophically inadequate and regulatorily insufficient l°
Even some who contributed to Belmont declare that conditions have
so changed1" that issues of distributional justice in connection with
required outside of the research context" is stated with reference to
medical procedures.
Consent forms are not used to document the patient's willingness to be
interviewed or to complete questionnaires. To cut to the bottom line
here, our group would like to present the argument that if we apply the
same standards to social research as are applied to biomedical research,
that it's rare that social research gets much more invasive or threatening
than what's asked in a routine family history during a routine medical
examination. And this then is one of the criteria for waiving the
requirement for documentation of consent.
In the current regulatory climate many IRBs treat social and behavior
research as if it were very risky. The focus on very minor or unlikely risks
has resulted in lengthy negotiations between IRBs and investigators and
overly detailed, insultingly paternalistic, informed consent procedures.
Robert Levine, Remarks at the Meeting of the Nat'l Human Research Protections
Advisory Comm. (April 29, 2002)(transcript, vol. I, at 329 11. 4-25 available at
http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/nhrpac/mtg04-02/mtg0402.htm (last visited Nov. 22,
2003).
9. Areas of disagreement in research ethics include human-subjects research
"in societies in which individually informed consent would be culturally
inappropriate" and whether to "allow for cultural exceptions to the informed
consent requirement... because the subjects, as members of the cultural
community in question, would neither expect nor want, even if they could
understand, the insistence upon individual informed consent." Baruch A. Brody,
Research Ethics: International Perspectives, 6 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTH L. ETHICS
376, 376-384 (1997).
10. See, e.g., IRB Forum (Children's Hospital of Philadelphia), at
http://www.irbforum.org, 2002 passim (last visited November 22, 2003).
11. Until the 1990s, the paradigm for ethical analysis focused on the risks and
burdens of research, especially nontherapeutic research, and on the need to
protect potential and actual research subjects from harm, abuse, and
exploitation. This history in the United States, as Carol Levine notes, "was
born in scandal and reared in protectionism." The regulation of research
sought to protect vulnerable persons from exploitation in scientific efforts
to benefit others. The dominant model in protectionist policies is
nontherapeutic research, i.e., research that offers no prospect of direct
therapeutic benefit to the subject. The concern is about an unfair
distribution of burdens. However, a paradigm shift recently occurred, in
part because of the interest of patients with AIDS in gaining access to new,
[Vol. 20:1
Are the Rationale and Regulatory System
access to health care now dwarf all other justice issues in biomedical
ethics. 12 The critics differ in perception of and prescription for the
regulatory system but agree at least that it is neither as efficacious nor
as practical as it ought to be.
Because Belmont and the system that developed from it are on the
chopping block, it is important to look clearly at the moral and
practical considerations that Belmont and the consequent regulatory
system seem to embody and to ask why Belmont and the regulatory
system are under attack. Are Belmont's lessons no longer of interest?
Is the regulated community behaving nicely now? Is the regulatory
system so clumsy and inconvenient as to defeat its ostensible intent? Is
Belmont philosophically adequate? Is Belmont insufficient as a
regulatory instrument? Is the emphasis on autonomy outdated? Can
we not exclude the possibility that in public biomedical ethics there is
either (a) naivet6 about fundamental moral questions posed by human
subjects research, or (b) distress equally at hearing biomedical ethics
doubted and seeing it practiced?
experimental drugs within as well as outside of clinical trials. The focus
shifted to therapeutic research and to the possible benefits of clinical trials
(deemphasizing their risks). As a result, justice as fair access to research
(both participation in research and access to the results of research)
became as important as protection from exploitation. Similar observations
apply to the participation of women in research.
TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
226-227 (5h ed. 2001) (annotations omitted). Beauchamp and Childress depict the
protection of human subjects of research as a distributional justice issue rather
than one of rights, possible infringement of autonomy, or non-maleficence. The
Belmont Report, to which both contributed, mentions benefits and burdens of
research (these may be incommensurable) but does not do so within an analysis of
theoretical issues of justice -distributional or otherwise. The extensively
documented memoir in commission member Albert Jonsen, THE BIRTH OF
BIOETHICS (1998), does not discuss Belmont's burdens-benefits statement or how
commissioners thought the local review system would play out in practice. This
should not be surprising. Often in legislative practice, of which the National
Commission was a piece, the outcome differs from what the participants had in
mind at the time.
12. "Policies of just access to and financing of health care, together with
strategies of efficiency in health care institutions, dwarf in social importance every
other issue considered in this book." Id. at 272.
20031
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Distinguishing inherent problems from attitude problems
The complaints frequently heard are numerous and sometimes
conflicting. This regulatory system slows things down; it does not slow
things down. It works; it does not work. Institutional Review Boards
(IRBs), responsible for review of ethical aspects of research covered
by this regulatory system, are slow and under-resourced.
Interpretations of the rules are inconsistent. Compliance sometimes is
desultory. Safety of subjects is not monitored properly. Oversight and
enforcement are confusing and episodic. Therefore it is important to
distinguish between problems that inhere in the regulatory scheme and
the problems that are artifacts of enforcement policy and/or attitudes
toward compliance.
Regulatory Structure
In administrative law and regulatory practice, the common sense
expectations of a practical and efficacious regulatory regime are that
the nature of the arrangement be plain to see, that due process obtains
in its administration, that the regulatory structure and its operation are
stable and predictable, and that the regulated community be invested
in the regime's successful operation.
The regulatory structure here is a form of audited self-regulation,"
minimalist regulation appropriate enough where the issues tend to be
fact-intensive, judgment and common sense are required, and the
regulated community buys into the system.14 The regime's basic
13. Audited self-regulation "is the exercise of... delegated power subject to
review by a federal agency." DOUGLAS C. MICHAEL, ADMIN. CONF. U.S.,
FEDERAL AGENCY USE OF AUDITED SELF-REGULATION AS A REGULATORY
TECHNIQUE 6 (1993 & Supp. Rep. 1994). This regulatory technique is advantageous
where technical issues are involved and flexibility is required. Id. at 12-13. The
technique is disadvantageous where agency enforcement is inadequate and/or
public interests are not considered. Id. at 21-22. See also ADMIN. CONF. U.S., ANN.
REP. (1993) at 9 (noting breath of use of this regulatory technique).
14. Researchers in the human-subjects protection system are active in
operating the system but because of requirements for outside and non-scientist
IRB members and the persuasive power of recorded dissent cannot fully control it.
By endorsing ... institutional review boards, the Commission created
local forums where research was discussed-not in the abstract, but in the
concrete particulars of specific protocols. Institutional review
boards... do not debate protocols without guidance: definitions and rules
[Vol. 20:1
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outlines are clear, spelled out in 45 C.F.R. part 46 for the Department
of Health and Human Services and in almost identical regulations for
several other agencies. The U.S. Government cannot fund proposed
research or approve drug trial results if that work involves human
subjects and is covered by the regulations unless the work is approved
by IRBs - local ethics review bodies comprised of insiders, outsiders,
scientists, and non-scientists. The arrangement respects scientific
expertise while mandating exposure of proposals to evaluation from
perspectives and reward structures other than those of the proposer. It
is directed toward deliberation (although some institutions try to
short-cut or eliminate deliberation). These regulations require similar
protections for U.S.-funded transnational research. The system is
overseen by the federal agencies that sponsor or evaluate the
research.15
Is such a system inherently unworkable for science where ethical
problems must be faced and where there is pressure to do research of
seeming promise for human health? In form and function, the U.S.
system for regulation of research on animals is almost identical to the
IRB system. 6 Anti-vivisection is long established in U.S. politics, and
opponents of animal research pay the system close, critical attention.
Although many would shut down all animal research, and the
are conveyed to them through federal regulations, supplemented by
guidebooks, and enhanced by the... experiences of the reviewers. The
IRB system, while not perfect in conception or realization, has succeeded
in preventing abusive research for over two decades and, more
importantly, has introduced the ethical problems into the realm of public
discourse. Thousands of persons, from health professionals to hospital
chaplains, have served on IRBs and become familiar with the language
and the topics of clinical research....
ALBERT JONSEN, THE BIRTH OF BIOETHICS 157 (1998) (annotation omitted).
Regulatory systems may fail if the regulated community does not perceive itself as
benefiting from the regulations. The prevalent defiance of highway speed laws
illustrates the failure of a regulatory system without buy-in from the regulated
community.
15. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2002).
16. This system differs from the human subjects research regulation primarily
in that the U.S. Department of Agriculture regulates the activity rather than
federal spending, while the Public Health Service does its own enforcement by
restricting spending but defers to Agriculture's standards. Dep't of Agric., Animal
Welfare, 9 C.F.R. §§ 2.1- 2.11 (2003); Office of Laboratory Animal Welfare, Public
Health Service Policy on Humane Care and Use of Laboratory Animals, available
at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/olaw/references/phspol.htm (last visited November
22, 2003).
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regulations and regulatory guidance are tweaked from time to time,
the system functions routinely without significant opposition to the
regulatory structure itself. So the basic regulatory structure is not
necessarily the problem, although, of course, the stakes in and moral
responsibility for human subjects research are vastly higher.
Is the human subjects regulatory regime stable and predictable?
Because the topic has become so politicized and enforcement has been
episodic, 7 it is hard to say. The U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services reorganized and ostensibly elevated its human
subjects protection enforcement program. But its initial director's
time in this regulatory office was marked by mixed signals, beginning
with an appearance before the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission to eschew a regulatory role." Interest in consistent
regulation was not apparent.' 9  A committee of the Institute of
17. See, e.g., Drazen, supra note 7, at 1380 (arguing against suspension of acute
respiratory distress studies by the Government pending resolution of questions of
research design safety). "The methods used to resolve the dispute must be well
defined, transparent, and time-sensitive." Id.
18. Nat'l Bioethics Advisory Conmm'n (Sept. 12, 2000) (testimony of Greg
Koski incoming director, Office of Health and Human Services), at http://www.
georgetown.edu/research/nrcbl/nbac/transcripts/sept00/9-00dayl.pdf (last visited
Nov. 22, 2003). Dr. Koski stated:
I believe that the current model is one that is largely confrontational in its
foundation. It is a model that is focused primarily on compliance, and I
don't believe that it is well suited to meet the challenges we are going to
face in the next two decades of research.
•.. It is just seems to me inherent in any process where there are a set
of regulations that are going to govern what one group of individuals are
going to do, you know, with another that is subject to an oversight process.
That oversight process is going to be one that is stuck in the middle and
will invariably be seen as an adversarial type process. That, I believe, is
destructive to the overall process, and that is why I said that if we can
manage to get the IRBs out of the middle and instead incorporate
everyone into a collaborative, cooperative process that focuses on
protection of human subjects, we will be better of[f].
Id. at 196, 209-210.
19. Rick Weiss, Research Protection Chief to Leave HHS; 2-Year Tenure Gets
Mixed Reviews, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2002, at A19, reporting:
Koski's... tenure had received mixed reviews in recent months, with
some saying he had improved protections and others saying his tenure has
been long on talk but short on action.
[Vol. 20:1
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Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences concluded,
"Eventually, Congress will need to take the necessary steps to broaden
and strengthen the federal oversight system . . .. 0
Monitoring as needed for safety of subjects is already required.
Confusion regarding due process traces back to a departmental
tradition of heavy reliance on informal guidance rather than on
straightforward notice-and-comment rulemaking and clear
enforcement procedures.
Conceptually then, the major open questions seem to be less about
the regulatory system than about the quality and extent of regulatory
Koski said the office has created programs to help research institutions
"Do it right, together," the office motto he coined. Also in the works is a
voluntary accreditation system for institutions that conduct human
research.
Koski ... found himself between two very vocal factions, one calling
for new and formalized federal rules governing patient safety and conflicts
of interest, and the other favoring voluntary standards that would largely
be overseen by research institutions themselves.
On several occasions, sources said, Koski triggered grumbling on
Capitol Hill for taking positions without first going through the usual
political channels, or for releasing formal documents that had not first
been approved by the Office of Management and Budget - moves that
one insider attributed to a mix of naivetd and Koski's growing frustration
with the system.
Id. See also Joceylyn Kaiser, Protecting Human Subjects: Koski Steps Down After
Bumpy Ride, 298 SCIENCE 721, 721-22 (2002), reporting:
OHRP has begun developing a system in which institutions-rather
than the government-grade themselves on their oversight programs. A
report.., from the Institute of Medicine supports this approach, as well as
voluntary accreditation of human-subjects protection programs.
Some patient advocates and members of Congress, however, are
pushing for mandatory standards....
Id. A few days after leaving office, Dr. Koski disparaged what he termed
"hyperprotectionism" and said he would not accord protection as a research
subject to a mentally retarded teen-ager whose bone marrow would be taken for
transplant to an ailing sibling who was the primary subject on a clinical research
project. Greg Koski, "When Is a Child a Research Subject?," Ethics Grand
Rounds, Warren G. Magnuson Clinical Center, National Institutes of Health,
December 4, 2002, at http://videocast.nih.gov/PastEvents.asp?c=22 (last visited
November 22, 2003); Rebecca Spieler Trager, Human research oversight system has
let scientists abdicate ethics, Koski asserts, WASH. FAX, December 12, 2002.
20. Inst. of Med. of the Nati'l Acad. Sci., supra note 7, at 18.
2003]
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oversight, the extent of institutional support for good-faith compliance,
and recognition of ethical issues in human subjects research. Here
Belmont takes on its special significance, not only because of its
content but, more important, because it is the justifying document
referenced in the preamble to the initially promulgated modern human
subjects protection regulations21 and in administrative law is thus to be
22
used in interpreting those regulations.
The Belmont Report
Belmont is a regulatory, not a philosophic, document.23 It calls for
unflinching recognition of ethical issues, notwithstanding the nobility
of intentions or predispositions as to whether contemplated research
would be ethically permissible. It calls for judgment. It calls for
squarely recognizing, well before a possible program or project of
biomedical or behavioral research on human beings begins, that the
researcher and the research subject are of equal moral status, and that
fundamental, universal legal and ethical norms proscribe the coerced
use of one human being for the purpose of another except in
extraordinary circumstances under due process of law.
II. LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES
Fundamental, universal legal and ethical norms proscribe the coerced
use of one human being for the purposes of another
Fundamental, universal legal and ethical norms proscribe the
coerced use of one human being for the purposes of another absent
21. Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the
President, Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects Final Rule, 56 Fed.
Reg. 28,003 (June 18, 1991) (Common Rule, adopted by 16 agencies, and preamble
incorporating Belmont Report by reference directly in some respects, as by
reference to burdened populations, and indirectly, by reference to Federal Register
notices of reports of the President's Commission, in turn citing the predecessor
National Commission).
22. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
23. The legislation creating the National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research required prompt,
substantive agency response to the Commission's reports and recommendations, 41
U.S.C. § 300v-1(b), and continues to be cited as regulatory authority by the
Department of Health and Human Services, 45 C.F.R. pt. 46.
[Vol. 20:1
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due process of law. The proposed use of human beings as the subjects
of research presents two ethical issues at the outset:
(a) Whether one human being is used merely as a means to
attain the purposes of another. This is sometimes ethically
permissible, sometimes not, depending on purposes and
protections.
(b) Whether the human subject of research is coerced. Coercion
of potential and actual research subjects is ethically and legally
impermissible, worldwide. "In particular, no one shall be
subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific
experimentation. 24
These norms are expressed in international law, transcending
cultures; in domestic law; in international and domestic policy
statements; in philosophical and religious writings; in professional
codes and statements; and in literature.25
U.S. protection of human subjects of biomedical and behavioral
research is constitutionally grounded and reflects U.S. international
obligations
The U.S. Government promulgated regulations for the
protection of human subjects of research well before ratifying the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The U.S.
interpretation, in its initial report of compliance, is that the Covenant's
Article 7 proscription against unconsented medical experimentation
stands independent of that same article's prohibition of torture; that
U.S. regulation to protect human subjects of research is
constitutionally grounded; and that U.S. human subjects protection
regulations comply with U.S. international obligations.26 The sweep of
24. Int'l Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, at http://www.
unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a/_ccpr.htm (last visited November 22, 2003) (entered
into force March 28, 1979, ratified June 8, 1992; 149 ratifications.) Article 7 is non-
derogable even in times of emergency pursuant to 2 art. 4.
25. See, e.g., JOHN LE CARRt, THE CONSTANT GARDENER (2001) (novel on
pharmaceutical industry operations in Africa).
26. See also MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL & POLITICAL
RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 137-141 (1993). Nowak says the term "in
particular" implies that the prohibition "does not extend to experiments whose
interference with personal integrity does not reach the degree of degrading or
inhuman treatment," and (in his view) "clinical testing of pharmaceutical products
without the knowledge and/or consent of the person concerned falls within the
scope of Art. 7 only when the effects . . . constitute degrading or inhuman
2003]
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the U.S. interpretation on the latter two points is breathtaking and
provides inter alia:
2 7
178. Medical or scientific experimentation. Non-consensual
experimentation is illegal in the U.S. Specifically, it would
violate the Fourth Amendment's proscription against
unreasonable searches and seizures (including seizing a person's
body), the Fifth Amendment's proscription against depriving
one of life, liberty or property without due process, and the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against the infliction of cruel
and unusual punishment.
179. Comprehensive control of unapproved drugs is vested by
statute in the federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The general use of such drugs is prohibited, see 21 U.S.C. section
355(a), but the FDA permits their use in experimental research
under certain conditions. 21 U.S.C. sections 355(i), 357(d); 21
C.F.R. section Part 50. The involvement of human beings in such
research is prohibited unless the subject or the subject's legally
authorized representative has provided informed consent, with
the limited exceptions described below. The FDA regulations
state in detail the elements of informed consent. 21 C.F.R.
sections 50.41-50.48.
180. An exception is made where the human subject is
confronted by a life-threatening situation requiring use of the
test article, legally effective consent cannot be obtained from the
subject, time precludes consent from the subject's legal
representative, and there is no comparable alternative therapy
available. The Commissioner of the FDA may also determine
that obtaining consent is not necessary if the appropriate
Department of Defense official certifies that informed consent is
not feasible in a specific military operation involving combat or
the immediate threat of combat. This regulatory exception has
been challenged in litigation and upheld as consistent with the
treatment," but "[riegard must also be paid to the indications in the travaux
pr~paratoires that the lack of free consent is to be considered a sign of the inhuman
character of a medical experiment." Id. at 141(emphasis added).
27. U.S., INITIAL REPORTS OF STATES PARTIES DUE IN 1993: UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, art. 7, §178-87 (CCPR Human Rights Comm., State Party Report
CCPR/C/81/Add.4, 1994, at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/da936c49e
d8a9a8f8025655c005281cf?Opendocument (last visited November 22, 2003). See
also Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003) (reaffirming prisoner's due process
liberty interest in freedom from government-imposed, unwanted psychiatric
treatment).
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governing statutes and the U.S. Constitution. Doe v. Sullivan,
938 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
181. The United States has also undertaken substantial efforts to
diagnose and redress injuries that may have been caused by past
exposure to potentially dangerous military agents. Thus, it
continues to fund epidemiological studies in an attempt to
resolve lingering scientific and medical uncertainty surrounding
the long-term health effects of exposure to herbicides containing
dioxin and to ionizing radiation. It has also provided military
veterans with an expeditious means of obtaining compensation
for claims based on exposure to such herbicides during service in
the Republic of Viet Nam, or exposure to ionizing radiation
during atmospheric nuclear tests or the American occupation of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and has established guidelines for
evaluating and applying the latest scientific evidence. The
Veterans Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation
Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 98-542, 98 Stat. 2727 (1984). Civilian
residents of the relevant areas put at risk by nuclear testing or
employed in uranium mining can also recover sizeable
compensation if they have developed any of a number of
specified diseases. Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, Pub.
L. No. 101-426, 104 Stat. 920 (1990).
182. In December 1993, it became widely known that between
1944 and 1974 the United States Government conducted and
sponsored a number of experiments involving exposure of
humans to radiation. While certain experiments resulted in
valuable medical advances including radiation treatment for
cancer and the use of isotopes to diagnose illnesses, a number of
the experiments may not have been conducted according to
modern-day ethical guidelines. Moreover, the majority of the
records of the experiments were kept secret for years. The
United States Government has taken a number of steps to
investigate the propriety of the experiments. For instance, the
Department of Energy established a centralized information
centre in Washington, D.C., that holds 270,000 records on
nuclear testing and 7,000 records on all types of human
experiments, and identified approximately 2,500 records of
human radiation experiments and placed them in public reading
rooms around the country. By executive order in January 1994,
the President established the Advisory Committee on Human
Radiation Experiments, which is charged with investigating the
propriety and ethics of all human radiation experiments
conducted by the Government, and determining whether
researchers obtained informed consent from their subjects....
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183. Experimentation on prisoners is restricted by the Fourth,
Fifth, and Eighth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, by statutes, and by agency rules and regulations
promulgated in response to such provisions. As a general
matter, in the United States, "[e]very human being of adult
years or sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done
with his own body ..."  Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hospitals, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914). Accordingly,
prisoners are almost always free to consent to any regular
medical or surgical procedure for treatment of their medical
conditions. Consent must be "informed": the inmate must be
informed of the risks of the treatment; must be made aware of
alternatives to the treatment; and must be mentally competent
to make the decision. But due to possible "coercive factors,
some blatant and some subtle, in the prison milieu", (James J.
Gobert and Neil P. Cohen, Rights of Prisoners, New York:
McGraw Hill, Inc., 1981, pp. 350-51) prison regulations generally
do not permit inmates to participate in medical and scientific
research.
184. The Federal Bureau of Prisons prohibits medical
experimentation or pharmaceutical testing of any type on all
inmates in the custody of the Attorney General who are
assigned to the Bureau of Prisons. 28 C.F.R. section 512.11(c).
185. Moreover, the federal government strictly regulates itself
when conducting, funding, or regulating research in prison
settings. An Institutional Review Board, which approves and
oversees all research done in connection with the federal
government must have at least one prisoner or prisoner
representative if prisoners are to be used as subjects in the study.
Research involving prisoners must present no more than a
minimal risk to the subject, and those risks must be similar to
risks accepted by non-prisoner volunteers. See 28 C.F.R. Part 46.
Furthermore, guidelines established by the Department of
Health and Human Services provide that the research proposed
must fall into one of four categories:
"(1) Study of the possible causes, effects, and
processes of incarceration, and of criminal behaviour,
provided that the study presents no more than a minimal
risk and no more than inconvenience to the subject;
(2) Study of prisons as institutional structures or of
prisoners as incarcerated persons, provided that the study
presents no more than minimal risk and no more than
inconvenience to the subject;
[Vol. 20:1
Are the Rationale and Regulatory System
(3) Research on conditions particularly affecting
prisoners as a class;
(4) Research on practices, both innovative and
accepted, which have the intent and reasonable probability
of improving the health and well-being of the subject."
45 C.F.R. section 46.306(a)(2).
186. Similar standards have been developed within the broader
correctional community that strictly limit the types of research
conducted in prisons, even with an inmate's consent....
187. Non-medical, academic research on inmates is normally
allowable in federal and state prisons with the inmate's express
consent. This type of research normally consists of inmate
interviews and surveys. Inmates are not required to participate
in any research activities other than those conducted by
correctional officials for purposes of inmate classification,
designation, or ascertaining inmate programme needs (e.g.,
employment preparation, educational development, and
281
substance abuse and family counselling).
This report of compliance is a commitment by the United States
under its multilateral treaty obligations and arguably under customary
international human rights law. Softening the overall U.S.
commitment under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights would likely incur unacceptably heavy political costs at home
and abroad. Probably due to agency and academic parochialism, this
material does not appear in bioethics literature or in U.S. regulatory
guidance. Nevertheless, it is the U.S. Government's most elaborate,
although not necessarily comprehensive, formal position on its own
obligations in international law.
Biomedical and behavioral research on human beings raises ethical
challenges
Research on human beings involves the use of these persons at least
partly for someone else's purposes. The interests of researcher and
research subject may coincide or conflict. 9  Power disparities in
relationship between researcher and subject are inevitable, stemming
especially from a subject's relative ignorance, limited range of
28. INTIAL REPORTS OF STATE PARTIES, supra note 27.
29. ROBERT M. VEATCH, BASICS OF BIOETHICS 140-143 (2d ed. 2003)
(distinguishing research from therapy and elaborating on ethical concerns in
research on human subjects).
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alternatives, trust, fear, and the psychological auras of effects of
science, government, and medicine. The subject may be particularly
vulnerable - as a patient, a child, an incompetent, or one of a class of
people whose individuality and rights are not always respected. The
roles and obligations of researchers are not necessarily clear to
researcher or subject. Researcher, subject, or both may entertain the
illusion that the research is necessarily therapeutic, that is, for the
subject's benefit. Neither researcher nor subject may adequately
understand the research, its purposes, and its possible effects.
Biomedical and behavioral research on human beings may be ethically
desirable and may be ethically acceptable or impermissible
Biomedical and behavioral research on human beings may be
essential to alleviate human suffering generally.30 Biomedical and
behavioral research may help alleviate the condition of an individual
patient. Research on human beings may be done in a manner
consistent with the rights of subjects and the ethical obligations of
health professionals. But some moral questions concerning research
may be unavoidable. Conscription of human research subjects on the
grounds of social utility squarely conflicts with human rights.
The starting point for deciding whether to conduct biomedical or
behavioral research on human beings should be to consider the
possibility that the research as contemplated may not be ethically
permissible. Filling out the relevant forms correctly and getting the
requisite approvals do not make biomedical and behavioral research
on human beings ethically permissible.
III. ETHICALLY CHALLENGING RESEARCH AND RESEARCH
PROPOSALS RECUR
Law to restrict federal spending on biomedical research likely to
transgress the rights of human subjects is now institutionalized,
although it is criticized and not necessarily well enforced. Arguably,
the bare bones of the regulatory scheme are well known to the
regulated community. At least a minimal acquaintance with the
controlling regulatory arrangement is required of that community.
30. Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Necessity, Promise, and Dangers of Human
Experimentation, in EXPERIMENTS WITH MAN: REPORT OF AN ECUMENICAL
CONSULTATION 31-56 (Hans-Ruedi Weber ed., 1969).
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Additionally, there is an apparent self-vs.-community conflict in
discussions of who bears burdens and who gets benefits.
Perhaps Belmont is pass6, the problem addressed, many of the
recommendations followed, and the world now resolved to act rightly.
Belmont, from a time long past, is a political document, a response to
the offenses then embodied most notably in the Tuskegee and Public
Health Service scandal. Surely, no one now would pretend to treat
poor, black men for syphilis while studying them as they go untreated.
There was the repeated plasmapheresis of prisoners to the point of
anemia, but that was still in the 1970s, after the Tuskegee scandal but
before Belmont. Maybe taking blood products from prisoners was an
31oversight. There were the unconsented radiation studies, some
post-Tuskegee but pre-Belmont; they were Cold War artifacts. On the
whole, the U.S. biomedical research community changed in response
to Belmont. The U.S. system for protection of the human subjects of
research became a remarkable model, despite the difficulties that
attend any regulatory scheme.
Perhaps there is no more call to forestall or deter bad acts by
researchers. Perhaps biomedical ethics no longer has anything to
inquire about in this regard. These assumptions, however, do not
32appear to be the case. Individual, responsible judgment is still
31. Advisory Comm. on Human Radiation Experiments, Final Report (1995).
32. See generally Dep't of Human Servs, Office of the Inspector Gen., The
Globalization of Clinical Trials: A Growing Challenge in Protecting Human
Subjects (2001), at http://www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-00-00190.pdf (last
visited November 22, 2003); see also Joe Stephens et al., The Body Hunters, WASH.
POST, Dec. 17-22, 2000 (reporting unethical practices in biomedical research on
human subjects in underdeveloped), available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/world/issues/bodyhunters/ (last visited November 22, 2003); see also
Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 8118, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17436 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 17, 2002) (rejecting defendant's motion for dismissal for failure to state a
claim under Alien Tort Claims Act, (28 U.S.C. § 1350), alleging research abuses
against Nigerian children in Nigeria, and provisionally dismissing on grounds of
forum non conveniens, provided defendant did not object to trial in Nigeria and
that Nigeria would consider the claim), vacated, remanded, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
20704 (2d Cir. N.Y., Oct. 8, 2003) (absence of alternative forum). See also
Memorandum from P. Wray Nelda, Chief Research and Dev. Officer, to ACOS/R
(Mar. 6, 2003), at http://wwwl.va.gov/resdev/fr/standdown/memo.cfm (last visited
November 22, 2003):
1. Background: In the eight short weeks since I assumed responsibility as
Chief Research and Development Officer (CRADO), I have had to
address a number of incidents concerning the protection of human
subjects involved in interventional research studies that have the potential
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required as to who may use whom for what, and when, why, and with
what protections in place,3  but the need for such judgment may be
buried, finessed, forgotten, or dismissed.
Three current research programs illustrate the challenge to candidly
face and address the ethical implications of contemplated research on
human beings, well before that contemplated research program or
project acquires momentum and well before encountering such
regulatory details as how to categorize apparent risk. The following
three programs each implicate individual ethical responsibility in a
large organizational context. The impetus for each program is political
(response to public constituencies), organizational (response to agency
imperatives and folkways), individual (responses to career interests
and to perceived public needs), and scientific (response to perceived
needs for knowledge). Each program involves or is proposed to
involve hundreds or thousands of subjects. The subjects in these
examples is are presumably more vulnerable than ordinary people.
Each program is intended for the benefit of a class of persons from
which the subject is drawn but is not intended for the identifiable
benefit of any particular, identifiable subject.
Vaginal flora research:
The effects and persistence of vaginal flora in a Southern U.S. public
clinic population have been under study for several years. This
program includes microbial sampling and behavioral research.
34
to put research subjects at risk. Those incidents include the falsification of
individual patient data that contributed to the death of one or more
patients; the inadvertent overdosing with a study medication of a research
participant; an experimental procedure that was conducted without the
prior approval of either the Institutional Review Board (IRB) or
Research and Development (R&D) Committee; and a phase 4 drug study
that was conducted without a principal investigator (PI) of record with
clinical privileges to prescribe and monitor the study medication and the
failure of an IRB to meet even the minimal standards required by the
Common Rule.
Id. See also Robert Pear, Nationwide Inquiry at Veterans' Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES,
April 13, 2003, at A14.
33. For example: "Among people who do work like ... studies on the very
young, the very sick, there is no shortage of cowboys," says Steven Hyman, who
was the director of the National Institute of Mental Health .... Sheryl Gay
Stolberg, Preschool Meds, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 17, 2002, at 59, 60.
34. Nat'l Inst. of Child Health & Human Dev., Current Research: Longitudinal
study of vaginal flora (2003), at http://www.nichd.nih.gov/despr/ epirsh.htm (last
visited November 22, 2003).
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Purposes notwithstanding, such research in a clinic population raises
questions of (1) whether recruitment is suggested by gatekeepers to
these subjects' care; (2) whether subjects would understand fully that
the research is not therapeutic; (3) whether subjects might misperceive
the study as one in which they would be notified of findings from study
of their tissues; and (4) whether there is a non-negligible possibility of
violation of privacy.
Children's Health Initiative and the National Children's Study:
A multi-agency federal program will undertake a large set of
observational epidemiological and behavioral studies, ultimately
involving approximately 100,000 children, with a focus on physical
and social environment and with involvement of local public school
and social service authorities.35 The studies will involve identified
primary subjects and identified third parties and probably will
involve the taking of tissues from children deemed autistic.
Effective legal mechanisms for safeguarding confidentiality do not
exist. Recruitment of subjects will be encouraged by school systems
and local booster committees. Numerous National Institutes of
Health and interagency committees, including an ethics committee
appointed for this purpose, are involved. As the program was
getting organized, the ethics committee noted that several ethical
issues remained to be addressed, including recruitment questions,
informed consent, the right to withdraw from the study, rights
concerning tissue samples, and privacy and confidentiality.36 A
member of a behavioral sciences subcommittee of the National
Human Research Protections Advisory Committee had reported
that social research is by definition minimal risk.37
Alzheimer's tissue banking:
A large, federally funded, expanding multi-institution program
gathers tissue from Alzheimer's Disease patients and their families
35. Children's Health Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310, 114 Stat. 1101 (2000);
See The Nat'l Children's Study, Organizational Chart, at http.www.national
childrensstudy.gov/committees/(detailing scope of study)(last visited November 22,
2003).
36. Envtl. Protection Agency & Nat'l Institutes of Health, National Children's
Study: Ethics Working Group Report (undated), available at http://national
childrensstudy.gov/committees/ethics/report.cfm (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
37. Levine, supra note 8.
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18for Alzheimer's-related genetics studies in the unspecified future.
That the tissues are needed for the study of urgent health issues is
not in question. At a public discussion of related ethical concerns,"
this work was described as (1) minimal risk and (2) unjustifiably
hindered by state law barring research on individuals who could not
themselves legally consent unless the research was for the purpose of
benefiting the specific patient. Discussants did not address
vulnerability of families to discrimination or the vulnerability of
some subjects to coercion. No one present openly characterized the
proposal as one for the conscription of some persons, under color of
government or law, for the purposes of others. Two persons
suggested that autonomy had run its course and that it was time to
think of the larger society, and one person maintained that the rights
of researchers had to be considered.
These programs seem innocuous, possibly useful, perhaps dearly
needed. Each program might be rationalized by a reasonable local
Institutional Review Board as ethically acceptable with suitable
protections. To some readers, these examples may suggest failures of
ethical review or of the system. No such charge is intended here;
anyone can disagree with any board's findings. These examples
illustrate projects with potential to misuse human subjects in ways that
are difficult to pinpoint without reflection on the spirit of the human
subjects protection regulations.40 In these contexts, compliance with
38. ELISA EISEMAN & SUSANNE B. HAGA, HANDBOOK OF HUMAN TISSUE
SOURCES: A NATIONAL RESOURCE OF HUMAN TISSUE SAMPLES 36-40 (1999); Nat'l
Inst. on Aging , National Cell Repository: Selected Future Research Directions in
Alzheimer's Disease and the Neuroscience of Aging (2002) at http://www.nia.nih.
gov/fy2003 %5Fcongress/Justification.html#future-dir (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
39. September 9, 2002, at the National Institutes of Health.
40. See EISEMAN & HAGA, supra note 37, at 1. Taking of tissues should prompt
particularized inquiries "as recent and rapid advances in biological and medical
research made it possible to analyze DNA from almost any minuscule sample of
human tissue, concerns about privacy and informed consent have been raised.
Complicating these issues is the paucity of information addressing tissue
acquisition, use, and storage." Id. See also N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND
THE LAW, GENETIC TESTING & SCREENING IN THE AGE OF GENOMIC MEDICINE
68-73, 101-102 (2000). Experimental design, no matter how sophisticated, is by no
means free of ethical implications. Thus, an editorial in the Journal of Clinical
Oncology says of the acceleration of phase I (toxicity) trials of a chemotherapeutic
agent:
[T]he study design was not conducive to maximal risk reduction as it
potentially exposed more patients than necessary to doses exceeding the
maximum tolerated dose. For example, there was an unacceptably high
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no more than the letter of the law is insufficient ethically and legally.
Administrative lawyers are taught to look to Federal Register
preamble statements and references (here Belmont) to interpret
regulations, as the Administrative Procedure Act requires.4 , It is not
obvious to non-lawyers that the copy of Belmont that accompanies the
copy of the regulations provided to scientists and ethics board
members is of binding importance, even though the Government's
42published regulatory guidance should have made that clear.
No published records are available to show whether or how Belmont
was used to interpret the research subject protection regulations as
applied to these programs. But these programs obviously prompt
questions for which Belmont remains an appropriate interpretive
guide - in its totality and implications rather than as a set of discrete
rules to be applied specifically as reason for the researcher to proceed
or not. Belmont does not say expressly whether the burden of
persuasion to proceed with a project should be on the researcher or on
the reviewing entity. Belmont does not give a default rule. That is, it
does not say expressly to be (a) maximally restrictive, i.e., allowing
incidence of intolerable toxity by any standards . . .; six (50%) of 12
patients experienced severe (grade 3) nonhematological dose-limiting
toxicity, including five patients in the first course of treatment rather than
the maximally accepted norm of two patients .... [T]he simultaneous
entry of multiple patients provides little opportunity to apply the "brakes"
that should be built into the study to prevent or minimize toxicity in other
patients once severe toxicity is recognized.
Andrew W. Tolcher, Chris H. Takomoto, & Eric K. Rowinsky, Editorial: The
Multifunctional, Multi-Institutional, and Sometimes Even Global Phase I Study: A
Better Life for Phase I Evaluations or Just "Living Large"? 20 J. CLIN. ONCOL.
4,276, 4,276-4,278 (2002).
41. 5 U.S.C. § 522.
42. See Office for Protection from Research Risks, Institutional Review Board
Guidebook: Protecting Human Research Subjects 9 (1993). "[T]he Belmont
Report ... sets forth the basic ethical principles underlying the acceptable conduct
of research involving human subjects. Those principles, respect for persons,
beneficence, and justice, are now accepted as the three quintessential requirements
for the ethical conduct of research involving human subjects." Id. See also Alison
Wichman & Alan L. Sandier, Institutional Review Boards, in Principles and
Practices of Clinical Research 51-62 at 59 (John I. Gallin ed., 2002), (stating "[tihe
ethical foundation for the current laws governing human subject research
protections is enunciated in the Belmont Report...."). Wichman and Sandier are
from the Office of Human Subjects Research, Intramural Research Program,
National Institutes of Health; Gallin is director of the Warren G. Magnuson
Clinical Center, National Institutes of Health.
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only those projects that clearly could not be expected to violate any
violate precept or rule; (b) minimally restrictive, i.e., allowing all
projects that present no red flag; or (c) something in between. Instead,
Belmont gives researchers and reviewing entities sets of issues to
consider in determining whether a research project as proposed or
conducted warrants ethical doubt, and, if so, how the regulations
should be interpreted and applied in order to achieve an ethically
acceptable result.43  Review boards often require stipulated
modifications where necessary to alleviate their ethical concerns.
These examples suggest that Belmont would perform this function
well. Each of these programs intrudes into the personal lives of
vulnerable research populations, lends itself to misunderstanding, and
is not for the direct benefit of the prospective subjects. These are
matters of justice, as in the rights of persons to be free of unwarranted
intrusion into their lives. These are matters of respect for persons, as
in full disclosure of risks and benefits and in eliciting of fully voluntary
informed consent or refusal. These are matters of beneficence in that
43.
[R]ules often are inadequate to cover complex situations; at times they
come into conflict, and they are frequently difficult to interpret or apply.
Broader ethical principles will provide a basis on which specific rules may
be formulated, criticized and interpreted.
Three principles [respect for persons; beneficence; and justice], or
general prescriptive judgments, that are relevant to research involving
human subjects are identified in this statement. Other principles may also
be relevant. These three are comprehensive, however, and are stated at a
level of generalization that should assist scientists, subjects, reviewers and
interested citizens to understand the ethical issues inherent in research
involving human subjects. These principles cannot always be applied so as
to resolve beyond dispute particular ethical problems. The objective is to
provide an analytical framework that will guide the resolution of ethical
problems arising from research involving human subjects.
Belmont Report, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192 at 23,196 (April 18,1979). This is quite
different from a meet-the-requirements approach. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, David
Wendler, & Christine Grady, What Makes Clinical Research Ethical?, 283 J. AM.
MED. Ass'N 2,701-2,711 (2000) (which deems their essay's enumerated
requirements interpretable but "sufficient" and does not discuss Belmont).
Emanuel, et al. characterize 45 C.F.R. part 46 and the Council of Europe
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, both legal documents, as
"guidelines," along with non-government documents such as the Declaration of
Helsinki; they do not mention the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Id.
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the first interest of the biomedical or behavioral researcher working
with human subjects should be the best interests of the subject.
The use of Belmont in interpreting whether the intent of the rules
had been satisfied would have had the researchers and reviewing
entities consider in detail: How does the proposed selection of research
subjects and the research itself comport with respect for these
particular persons? How might the proposed research put these
particular persons at non-negligible risk? Would these uses of these
persons be fair?" How might the selection of research subjects or the
nature of the research be modified to accord with Belmont's
precepts? 45 These are not hard questions. Who are these people, why
and how do we propose to use them? Belmont does not delineate
rules; it suggests some, but certainly not all, points that should prompt
ethical concerns. Belmont makes plain that ethical concerns about
research on human beings should be resolved in favor of the proposed
or actual research subjects. This is Belmont's simple message as to
44.
Some populations, especially institutionalized ones, are already burdened
in many ways by their infirmities and environments. When research is
proposed that involves risks and does not include a therapeutic
component, other less burdened classes of persons should be called upon
first to accept these risks of research, except where the research is directly
related to the specific conditions of the class involved. Also, even though
public funds for research may often flow in the same directions as public
funds for health care, it seems unfair that populations dependent on public
health care constitute a pool of preferred research subjects if more
advantaged populations are likely to be the recipients of the benefits.
One special instance of injustice results from the involvement of
vulnerable subjects. Certain groups, such as racial minorities, the
economically disadvantaged, the very sick, and the institutionalized may
continually be sought as research subjects, owing to their ready
availability in settings where research is conducted. Given their dependent
status and their frequently compromised capacity for free consent, they
should be protected against the danger of being involved in research solely
for administrative convenience, or because they are easy to manipulate as
a result of their illness or socioeconomic condition.
Belmont Report, 44 Fed. Reg. at 23,196-23,197.
45. "When vulnerable populations are involved in research, the
appropriateness of involving them should itself be demonstrated. A number of
variables go into such judgments, including the nature and degree of risk, the
condition of the particular population involved, and the nature and level of the
anticipated benefits." Belmont Report, 44 Fed. Reg. at 23,196.
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how regulations for the protection of human subjects of biomedical
and behavioral research should be interpreted.
Current events in research suggest strongly that the Belmont Report's
central insights and lessons are still in point
Because Belmont was a response directly and cogently to actual,
notorious wrongs and the likelihood of their repetition, it has special
and credible emotional force. The report stems from reality, not
prescriptive assumptions. In contrast, the current critiques stem in
large part from concerns regarding inconvenience, delay, and expense.
Belmont is not a philosophical disquisition or ethical formulation. It
is unusual as a public policy document in that it is a secular articulation
of individual rights and societal values to be protected in the conduct
of research on human subjects.
Belmont sets forth not a checklist or fixed way of thinking about
proposed research. Rather, it urges that the moral challenges endemic
to research on human beings be carefully considered from several
standpoints-including respect for persons, beneficence (including
non-maleficence), and justice. These values are well served by
independent ethical review, informed consent, and special concern for
persons who are especially vulnerable. The modern, semi-independent
Institutional Review Board structure, to which the work of the
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research gave rise, draws its credibility
and effectiveness from the reality that gave it birth and from providing
for both public participation and researcher participation. In
administrative law terms, the regulated community is encouraged to
buy into the system, subject to conflict-of-interest restrictions. As the
three research program examples above make clear, the need for the
Belmont touchstones and the regulatory structure continue.
IV. COUNTER-ARGUMENTS
Generally, the counter-arguments to the foregoing fall into a few
categories. Self-pleading complaints about being regulated may be
deemed without ethical merit,46 although, as will be seen, not without
46. See, e.g., Mary L. Durham, How Research Will Adapt to HIPAA [Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996]: A View from Within the
Healthcare Delivery System, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 491, 492 (2000) (summarizing dire
warnings against initial promulgation of the Common Rule).
[Vol. 20:1
Are the Rationale and Regulatory System
implications. Some of the utilitarian criticism of Belmont and its
legacy is rooted not in selfishness but in deep, morally based concern
about the burden of illness. Criticism that there are no universals, that
this system and rationale are inapplicable to international projects
where they have no meaning in the local cultural setting, is not to be
dismissed. Criticism of how the system may fail or that it is unduly
burdensome should not be dismissed but should be considered
carefully.
The argument that the current regulatory system and rationale fail
for lack of anticipation of such new modes of research as multi-site
clinical trials is, on balance an argument not for abolishing the system
or rejecting its rationale but rather for heeding the rationale and
adapting to new circumstances,47 thereby strengthening the regulatory
system through appropriate enforcement policy and practice.
The argument that the examples offered above would not have
materialized had the regulatory system and its rationale been adequate
fails on two counts. First, it assumes that a research proposal that
triggers thought about moral consequences is therefore unethical not
only originally but also as it might be modified in light of critical
questioning. Second, it assumes that unanimity on the moral
acceptability of a research proposal as presented or modified is
essential.
The argument that Belmont and the current regulations should be
scrapped because abuses of human subjects have occurred and the
intent of the regulations has been flouted is an argument not for
ignoring the rationale and doing away with the current regulatory
mechanism but rather for heeding the rationale and enforcing and
strengthening regulatory protections. The strongest, most detailed
investigation ever undertaken into research abuses in the United
States was that by the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation
47. The National Cancer Institute, for example, arranged for a central
institutional review board to work in cooperation with local IRBs in a multi-site
clinical trial. That would be consistent with the intent behind the regulation. NCI
apparently sought and got advance OHRP comment on its proposed central-IRB
pilot. According to the Institute, the initiative was "in collaboration with" the
departmental Office of Human Research Protections. NATIONAL CANCER
INSTITUTE, INTRODUCTION TO MANUAL.DOC (April 16, 2002), available at
http://www.ncicirb.org/sops/Introduction toManual.PDF (last visited November
22, 2003). But "collaboration," implying that OHRP here was a co-performer or
regulatory consultant, which roles would conflict with regulatory neutrality, could
have been an overstatement or a genuine failure to understand regulatory posture.
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Experiments, which found substantial strengthening of human research
protections since Belmont and the Common Rule, although with some
continuing deficiencies. 48  The Committee recommended greater
emphasis on compliance with the Common Rule and recommended
strengthening but not abolishing it.49 Belmont and the Common Rule
are far from perfect, but an attempt to replace either or both would
likely become an exercise in discounting old but still valid important
and powerful lessons, and in jockeying for researcher and institutional
advantage, with the interests of research subjects unrepresented. As a
result, existing protections could well be lost. However, the current
human subject protection regulations leave room for forthright
enforcement guidance to the effect that good-faith compliance
includes clear, unprejudicial procedures for appointing and discharging
IRB members; ensuring that IRBs have the resources and true
organizational independence they need to do their work; guarding
against conflicts of interests; distinguishing between sincere ethical
review and paperwork; and transforming of reward structures in order
to encourage ethical design, review, and conduct of research. Taking
seriously the need to train and encourage students, researchers, and
practitioners in ethical discernment is not a regulatory matter, but it is
no less a duty of educators, mentors, and other persons who set the
examples.
The argument that regulation is unnecessary where people behave
properly begs the question of making reasonably clear the kinds of
insensitivity and conduct that transgress ethical bounds in the use of
human subjects in biomedical and behavioral research. American
political history is replete with such arguments. The implications,
when these arguments are raised by persons with bioethics in their
titles, are that the current system and rationale are somehow defective
ethically. Policy-makers and ethicists should beware of crediting that
kind of argument without deeper assessment of what the system
actually is, how it works or does not work, and what changes might
lead to what results.
The argument that more people will suffer, absent regulatory
streamlining, is and should be troubling. But while it is easy to
demonstrate that a given research subject may be at risk, it is very
difficult to prove that a given biomedical or behavioral experiment will
benefit that person or any persons (other than the investigators,
perhaps). If safety and efficacy were assured, then the intervention
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would not be experimental. Moreover, even in utilitarian terms, there
is no demonstrated connection between (a) shortcuts in protection of
human subjects, and (b) relief of human suffering. Those arguments
manifest the therapeutic illusion that biomedical and behavioral
experiments, even in hopes of therapeutic benefit, are designed for the
specific purpose of providing benefit for the individual subject or
patient. Even if some group benefit were to be found in short-cutting
protections, the challenge of fairness to individuals would persist. The
related argument that "this is for their own good" begs all of these
questions.
This regulatory scheme and rationale bar research on persons in
cultures that submerge individual rights and identity in group values.
That limitation has been criticized as culturally insensitive and as
unjustly denying the benefit of participation as experimental subjects
to desperately poor persons and societies in the midst of epidemics.
This criticism presupposes, worse yet, that the limitation bars possibly
useful research in those places where particular diseases or varieties of
disease occur uniquely. There are no universals, it has been said. Such
arguments0 disregard international law on informed consent and
conflate the therapeutic illusion with ideals of distributional justice.
There is almost no assurance of health benefit. That a disease or
condition may be unique to an isolated culture that does not respect
individual rights does not necessarily conflict with medical obligations
of beneficence. Research short of work on human subjects may
proceed, and doctors are not precluded from doing what they can to
reduce suffering or from urging appropriate public health measures.
Ignorance can be overcome, and lack of regard for human rights need
not be accepted as a given. Cultural sensitivity is not necessarily a
good excuse." The assertion by some researchers and some ethicists
50. See, e.g., Angeles Tan Alora & Josephine M. Lumitao, An Introduction to
an Authentically Non-Western Bioethics, in BEYOND A WESTERN BIOETHICS:
VOICES FROM THE DEVELOPING WORLD 18-19 (Angeles Tan Alora & Josephine
M. Lumitao eds., 2001) (stating "research must be placed within the particular
cultural, religious, and metaphysical context of particular developing countries"
but such concerns "set much of the developing world in direct contrast with the
world of Western bioethics"). The authors, dealing with the Philippines, thus
ignore the significance of their own reprint of the Philippines' legal requirements
for informed consent in medicine and medical research. Id.
51.
A researcher should not pick and choose which elements of a culture he or
she accepts based upon the way in which it will help or hinder the
research. "Cross-cultural sensitivity" does not give an experimenter
license to bend and break norms of professional conduct ....
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that no universals bar research in those difficult circumstances prompts
the question of why those individuals believe themselves uniquely
exempt from the non-derogable stricture in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, "... In particular, no one shall be
subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific
experimentation."
Argument that the system is exhausting and over-protective is not
proved and is probably not susceptible to proof or disproof. The
argument that it is burdensome financially is not an ethical question
and depends on how the institution chooses to allocate its resources.
There seems little question that institutional review boards are over-
burdened and under-resourced; that is an institutional management
question. The argument that the system forces researchers and
institutional review boards to thread a regulatory needle in order to
meet regulatory minima raises the questions of why honest ethical
doubt is undesirable and why researchers and boards may feel they
must resort to elaborate rationalization in order to go ahead with a
project. A related criticism is that informed consent documents may
amount to efforts not to completely inform the prospective research
subject but to evade liability. That amounts to criticism not of the
informed consent requirement but of institutional evasion and of laxity
of enforcement. Some critics argue that the system is at fault because
review boards are too restrictive. That seems to call for understanding
by boards and researchers of their common obligations to research
subjects. But it is not a substantive criticism of the system.
Experimental protocols may need to pass two ethical tests, a general
ethical test of respect for persons and a more specific test of how true
respect may be obtained in a particular culture.
This specific ethical test would not abandon basic values but rather ask
how such values are to be enfleshed in culturally different contexts.... On
occasion,.., a true impasse might arise because of a genuine clash of
values themselves. At such times, the experimenter may very well find it
ethically necessary to abandon a particular experiment in a particular
culture. Such cross-cultural sensitivity may benefit not only the subjects of
the experimentation but the ethical person who is the experimenter as
well.
Thomas A. Nairn, The Use of Zairian Children in HIV Vaccine Experimentation: A
Cross-Cultural Study in Medical Ethics, in ON MORAL MEDICINE 919, 928-929
(Stephen E. Lammers & Allen Verhey eds., 1998).
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CONCLUSIONS
Criticisms that the current regulatory system as applied is clumsy
and inconvenient do not respond to the challenge, clear in Belmont as
in Hans Jonas, to recognize ethical dilemmas, face them squarely, say
no when no is warranted, foster researcher involvement in the
regulatory system, focus on substance rather than form, and resist
automaticity.
If the regulatory system is to function well-i.e., protectively and
reasonably efficiently- then:
(1). Belmont's proper role should be recognized-not as a relict
document handed to review board members by way of
background but rather, as the law requires, as the primary legal
resource for interpretation in deciding how the human subjects
regulations apply.
(2). The United States' acknowledged, fundamental obligations to
protect research subjects under domestic and international law
should be recognized in the ethics and research communities.
(3). Both the system and proposed changes should be viewed
critically, in terms of efficacy rather than convenience.
(4). Attention should focus on ensuring predictability, stability, and
clarity of the regulatory system and resources and will to
enforce and comply-in letter and in spirit.
These are ethical and legal responsibilities of persons responsible for
protection of human subjects of biomedical and behavioral research.
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